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MENTAL ANGUISH IN THE LAW OF
DAMAGES
By EDWARD L. DUGGAN
Throughout the different fields of law the subject of mental
feelings is prominent. It is in the law of damages, however,
that the question of most decided interest concerning mental
suffering arises. There the legal treatment of anguish is seen
in its many phases; the anguish sued upon may have been the
only injury suffered or it may be merely an additional element
of damage. In the former case the rules of the court are at var-
iance. The general ruling denies the recovery of damages under
such a combination of facts, but several exceptions have en-
croached upon the rule. There is a minority doctrine of recent
origin, and it is interesting to trace its history and to study its
growth and expansion. A comparison of the two rules suggests
problems which have held the interest of many judicial tribunals.
When the mental suffering is merely an element of damages
most courts admit evidence of it as a basis for possible enhance-
ment of the sum awarded. Because this element is taken ad-
vantage of as soon as an independent cause of action exists,
however slight, it is termed parasitic, and great care has been
taken that it might not develop too extensively.
The general rule is that mental anguish alone will not con-
stitute a cause of action for the recovery of damages. So. Exp. Co.
v. Byers, 240 U. S. 612; McCarthy v. Boston El. R. 112 N. E. 235;
Rowan v. Western U. Tel. Co. 149 Fed. 550. This ruling follows
the common law doctrine that where the only injury suffered is
mental anguish a recovery of damages for such suffering is not
allowed. The courts following this doctrine base their decisions
mainly upon the ground that such damage is too remote, that
it is easily simulated and that there is no adequate means of
determining the damage suffered. These courts fear the in-
expediency of allowing such a recovery, believing that the dif-
ficulties attending the adoption of a contrary ruling would be too
great. The possibility of trumped up cases influence s their de-
cisions. It is contended that if the action be brought on a con-
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tract the damages could not be said to have been within the con-
templation of the parties at the time offentering into the con-
tract-while if the action is that of tort it is maintained that such
damages do not reasonably flow from the act committed. To
allow such.a recovery courts denying the rule contend, would be
to abrogate a known principle of the common law which they
consider a rigid thing and to the strictness of which they adhere.
The injury is considered to be damnum absque injuria.' The opinion
of these courts is that the remedy for such suffering should be
legislative rather than judicial.
There are certain exceptions to the general rule which re-
fuses recovery of damages for mental anguish alone. Thus, it
was early settled and is generally followed that in that class of
tort actions in which there is an element of a malicious, inten-
tional or wilful invasion of the plaintiff's rights there may be a
recovery for mental anguish even though it is the only injury,
suffered. Following this ruling courts have allowed recovery:
In cases of rape, Leach v. Leach, 33 S. W. 703. In cases of
malicious proscution, McKinely v. Chicago etc. R. Co. 24 Am. Rep.
(Iowa) 748. In case of false imprisonment, Chicago etc. R. Co. v.
Radford, 129 Pac. 834. Tn case of libel or slander, Butler et ux v.
Hoboken P. Co., 2 Atl. 1272. For the mutilation of a dead body,
Larson v. Chase, 50 N. W. 238; Lindh v. Gt. Nor. Ry. Co., 109 N. W.
823. Where plaintiff's father was thrown overboard without not-
ification to plaintiff, Finley v. At. Transport Co., 172 N. Y. App.
Div. 907. Where plaintiff's landlord wrongfully entered her prem-
ises, frightening her badly, Nordgren v. Lawrence, 133 Pac. 436.
Where a conductor wrongfully took up plaintiff's commutation ticket,
following a public altercation with plaintiff who was a passenger,
Harris v. D. W. L. W. R. R. Co., 72 At. 50. For refusing ad-
mission to an union, Carter v. Oster, 112 S. W. 995.
So also mental anguish has been considered a proper basis for
damages in particular cases on contracts. Exceptions to the general
ruling on this footing are: Breach of- promise to marry, Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395; Bird v. Thompson, 9 S. W. 788. Breach
of an undertakers contract to keep safely the body of a child, Reni-
han. v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536. Breach of contract to transport a
corpse,Loidsville v. Hull, 68 S. W. 433; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.
of Texas v. Linton, 141 S: W. 129; Hale v. Bonner, 17 S. W. 605;
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Wells Fargo Co. v. Fuller, 35 S. W. 824;!Controa: Long et al v. C. R.
I. & P. Ry. Co., 86 Pac. 289; So. Exp. Co. v. Byers, 36 Sup. Ct. 410,
Breach of contract to furnish trousseau on agreed day, Lezeds v.
Holmes, 34 So. 66. Breach of contract to deliver a suitable coffin
and robe, Dunn & Co. v. Smith, 74 S. W. 576.
A minority view to the general doctrine has arisen in what
is known as the telegraph cases. " In many jurisdictions mental
anguish caused by negligence of the telegraph companies in the
deliverance of messages relating to sickness and death is a good
cause of action alone for which damages are recoverable. The
pioneer~case adopting this view is that of So Relle' v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep. 805. The supreme Court
of Texas in 1881 in that case held that the telegraph company
was liable for injury to the feelings of a son by the wilful neg-
lect of the company to deliver to him a message announcing the
death of his mother whereby he was prevented from attending
the funeral, even though he sustained no other damage. The
court ruled in that case that mental anguish flowed naturally
from the negligence of the telegraph company and could reason-
ably be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties
when they entered into the contract. The court also laid emphasis
on the fact that the telegraph companies enjoy special franchises
and privileges and that the purpose of such organizations is to
furnish for compensation means of rapid and prompt communica-
tion-the use of which is expensive and resorted to only in
matters of importance, which ought to subject them to a duty
of care over and above their contractual obligation. This ruling
became known as the Texas doctrine and was bitterly attacked
by other courts at the time of its creation. Critics of this assail
the prior authority for this ruling, saying lit was entirely un-
supported-the mere statement of a textbook writer on negli-
gence and two cases which are held to be unsupporting on prin-
ciple. The doctrine of the So Relle case was overruled in Texas
several years later but was reestablished and is now firmly set-
tled in that state. It is followed in Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky,
Nevada, North Carolina and Tennessee. It is recognized under
the civil law of Louisiana, and in the states of Arkansas, South
Carolina and Wisconsin statutes have been enacted allowing a
recovery of such damages. In Indiana in the case of Reese v.W. U.
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Tel. Co., 24 N. E. 163, decided in 1890, the court of that state fol-
lowed the SotRelle doctrine stating that " the breach is not a mere
breach of contract but is a failure to perform a duty which rests
upon the company as a servant of the public". For 11 years
this doctrine was followed in Indiana-11 actual cases adopting
this principle. In 1901 in the case of Western Union Tel.'Co. v.
Ferguson, 60 N. E. 674. the Indiana Supreme Court overruled the
decision of the Reese case, refused to adopt the rule of the Texas
doctrine which was the basis of the ruling in the Reese case, and
would not allow a recovery, of mental anguish where it was the
only damage suffered. A strong dissenting opinion was written
in that-case. In the Ferguson case it was held that where
through the negligence of a telegraph company, failure to deliver
a telegram announcing the death of plaintiff's grandmother,
plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity of attending the funeral
but suffered neither pecuniary nor bodily injury, he cannot re-
cover for the mental anguish occasio~nfd by the telegraph
company's negligence. The court stressed considerably the
inadequate means of determining the actual damage suffered
although it admitted that damages might be recovered for such
suffering if the mental anguish was accompanied by an indepen-
dant cause of action. The Ferguson case has been since followed
in Indiana-all subsequent cases citing it as a precedent.
Under a statute in Oklahoma awarding "all damages" it
was held that mental anguish when unaccompanied by physical
injury was not included, Tiller v. St. Louis & Santa Fe, 189 Fed. 994.
The Federal courts follow the general rule and deny recovery
of damages for mental anguish alone. So. Pac. v. Hetzer, 1359
-Fed. 272; Stafford v. Tel. Co. 73 Fed. 273; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wood,
57 Fed. 471.
The numerical weight of authority is decidedly in favor of
the general irule which refuses to allow a recovery for mental
anguish alone, but from the standpoint of logic the ruling of. such
courts may well be attacked. In the majority ruling the courts
fear the impossibility of calculating the damages yet it seems
that there should be no more difficulty to estimate the damages
when the distress of mind is unaccompanied by a malicious, in-
tentional or wilful invasion of one's rights than in the case where
the mental suffering is the result of such evil intent. To deny
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a recovery in the former and not the latter type of case is to
reason on an illogical basis. The difficulty of determining the
actual amount to be awarded though seemingly great in theory
is not so in practice as few cases can be cited in which a re-
covery was held to be excessive'on appeal. The other grounds
upon which the majority ruling is based are vunerable to similar
attacks. To" deny a right lest it might result in much litigation
through asserting that right does not seem to be properly with-
in the province of the court. A breach by the telegraph comp-
any may well be considered to be more than a contractual
breach-it is a failure to perform a-public duty. The real pur-
pose of making the telegraph companies liable in such cases is
not the mere collection of a money value but to prevent the re-
currence of such offences and to establish the proposition that
one has no more right to outrage the feelings of another than to
injure his person or destroy his property. To adopt the majority
ruling is to recognize the common law to be a crystallized and rigid
thing which cannot be adapted to arising conditions. The fault
is not with the common law but -the narrow manner in which
it is applied. There is no reason why when the law protects
mental security that damages for mental suffering alone should
not to be given. The courts that follow the majority ruling elect
to proceed on an arbitrary rather than a logical ground for the
basis of their reasoning. These courts believe that the difficul-
ties that would follow from adopting such a rule would be too
great, yet if we consider the following of the minority view we
will find that the courts have worked out a set of principles which
is surrounded by limitations that insure a safe and sound reason-
ing Thus we see that the damage suffered must. be the. prox-
imate result of the negligence-not that of an intervening a-
gency-W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brdscoe, 47 N.'E. 473; Landry v. W. U.
Tel. Co. 113 S. W. 10. The message on its face must show that
such damage would result, it must show the necessity, of prompt de-
livery so that the parties could reasonably contemplate that such dam-
ages would occur through the negligence of the company, W. U. Tel.
Co. v. Bryant, 46 N, E. 358; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kibble, 115 S. W.
643; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Henly, 54 N. E. 77 ; and, the parties must
be close relatives, Lee v. W. U. Tel. Co., 113 S. W. 55; W. U. Tel.
Co. v. Steinbergen, 54 S. W. 829.
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Under both the majority and minority ruling the mental anguish
suffered must be more than mere inconvenience, vexation, worry,
disappointment, regret, etc.-it must be actual and not the result
of imagination or unfounded worry. Root v. Des Moines City R. Co.,
83 N. W. 904; W. U. Tel. Co. v. McKenzie, 131 S. W. 684. Also,
the act committed must have been done to the plaintiff-there can be
no recovery for mental anguish due to the mistreatment of another.
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Stratemeir, 32 N. E. 871;Cowden v. Wright,
35 Am. Dec. 633.
As an element of damages, where a cause of action exists
independent of such suffering, it is almost universally held that
damages may be recovered for mental anguish where it is the
natural and proximate result of a tort or a breach of contract.
A very slight ground constituting a case of -action will support
recovery of accompanying mental suffering. Direct evidence of
it is not required-it may be inferred from the surrounding facts
and circumstances. The fact that it is not susceptible of accurate
calculation will not constitute a bar to the award.
Where mental anguish is the natural consequence of physical
injury damages are recoverable for such suffering.,McDermnott v.
Severe, 202 U. S. 600. But where physical. injury results from men-
tal anguish, and, there is no actual injury to the person or property,
damages for such physical injury are not recoverable in those states
which do not allow the recovery of damages for mental anguish alone.
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kagy, 76 N.' E. 793; Curtin v. W. U. Tel. Co..
13 N. Y. App. Div. 253. The. courts whiich deny a recovery in the
latter case proceed on the ground that such damages iare not
the probable or natural consequence in the case of a person of
ordinary physical and mental vigor and that the physical injury
is not the proximate but rather the remote result of the defen-
dant's wrongdoing.
In the case of fright or fear alone the general rule is that there
can be no recovery of damages. Mitchell v. R. Co., 45 N. E. 354;
Spade v. Linn, 47 N. E. 88. In order to be a ground of recovery
accompanying personal injury is required. Considering that fear
is generally held to be a.physical thing-harmful to human organ-
isms-the general rule does not seem to be logical. Thus the Mary-
land court in Green v. Shoemaker Co., 73 Atl. 688, alloxi ed a recovery.
fol f fright alone which was caused by an explosion, and in Holdorf
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v. Holdorf, 169 N. W. 737, a recovery for fright without physical
impact but resulting in a physical injury, was allowed. These two
cases take a more logical basis for reasoning. than do those that follow
the general rule in this respect.
In the case of a breach of contract mental anguish standing
alone as the damage does not authorize a recovery with the ex-
ception that where from the nature -of the contract resulting
mental anguish would be a probable consequence of a breach.
Cases in which recovery is allowed under the exception to this
rule include: breach of promise to marry, breach of contract to
transport a -corpse, breach of contract of an undertaker to keep
safely the body of a child; (for citation of cases see supra) ; and
wilful ejection from a seashore bathhouse, Aaron v. Ward, 96 N.
E. 736.
Where mental anguish is attendant to an injury to property no
recovery is allow ed unless the injury to the property was due to
malice, fraud or like motives. Buchanan v. Stout, 123 N. Y. App.
Div. '48.
Considering the general allowance of recovery of damages
for mental anguish where it was merely an element of damages,
we find another inconsistency in the ruling of those courts which
refuse to allow the Texas doctrine, as promulgated by the So
Relle case all the objections invoked by those courts against that
doctrine might be just as well employed by them in the* case
where mental anguish is merely of damages, yet we see the same
courts allowing a recovery for such suffering if an independent
cause of action exists. There is no more adequate means of
determining the actual damage due to mental anguish in the
latter than in the former case. There is still the possibility
of trumped up cases as far as mental anguish is concerned and
it might be said that the difficulties of following such a principle
would cause it to be inexpedient. To allow a recovery. in one
class of cases and to deny it in the other where the same ob-
jections might be equally appropriate in both classes establishes
more fully the belief that the contrary decisions to the Texas
doctrine are arbitrarily laid down and not the result of sound
reasoning.
